By Kyril Wolfe
What makes an experience “religious?” The answer may seem obvious: an experience is “religious” if it concerns itself with religion or religious things. Traditionally, these are things like the Divine, the community of believers, the world and its origins, moral norms, ritual and mystical practices, the afterlife, and so on. For centuries across the West, to describe an experience as “religious,” “spiritual,” or any of their numerous synonyms meant addressing those things, and (I might be bold enough to say) presupposed their necessity or existence. If something did not presuppose those ideas, it did not fall into the “religious” category. This definition of what is “religious” lasted until very recently.
Today, however, the idea of the “religious” is no longer understood so narrowly. To give an example, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, prominent intellectuals like Bertrand Russell propounded atheism which was, in their view, meant to bring about the end of religion. Today, there are many groups—a prominent example being Satanists—which are both atheistic and anti-spiritual in their beliefs while also claiming “religious” status. How did we arrive at this situation, and what does it mean for the study of “religious” experience more broadly?
A problem of labels: “Supernatural,” “Mystical,” “Spiritual,” “Religious,” and others
One reason to consider is that, for a long time, the words “religious,” “spiritual,” “mystical,” and “supernatural” were treated as synonymous despite involving different claims. The word “supernatural” suggests that there is something more than the natural world, and that it is possible for acts that are not merely natural to happen (e.g. miracles). “Mystical” concerns itself with things beyond human understanding which, in some non-rational or hyper-rational way, we can contemplate and with which we can become united. The word “spiritual” implies that there are immaterial beings, regardless of whether you view them as supernatural (e.g. the Christian God) or as within the natural order (e.g. angels as “created,” the spiritual human soul). Lastly, the word “religious” involves notions of both organized religion (a faith community with its hierarchy and rules) and a set of moral obligations that are binding on a believer.
Each of these ideas is distinct, but they were not necessarily treated as such before modernity. During and after the Enlightenment, however, these claims were distinguished and separated from each other in considering questions of religion, and became the subject of criticism from figures like Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. These modern and modernist critiques transformed religion and its study, and for a time many wondered, in the face of rising secularity, agnosticism and atheism, if religion itself would come to an end.
“Spiritual, but not religious” and other contemporary formulations of “religious” experience
Yet religion was not extinguished by these developments of modernity. Instead, and unexpectedly, modernity and post-modernity afterward found themselves fascinated with religious experience. Many intellectuals sought to give an account of such experiences that would stand up to (or at least apart from) modern critiques of religion. As the 20th century moved on, we began to see people embrace some of the old terms in describing their experiences, while often times avoiding others. The “spiritual but not religious” movement embraced claims like the existence of the Divine, but were skeptical of organized religion. Contemporary humanists were often atheist or agnostic, but many of them formed structured organizations—often granted religious status—to promote their moral and social views and the humanist way of life. There were new forms of mysticism, like those in psychedelic experiences, which were not always tied-in to other claims like the existence of the Divine or moral obligations. The list goes on and on.
Yet one of the aspects of religion’s confrontation with modernity remained. Of the major movements studying religion and religious experience today, most accept (explicitly or implicitly) the validity of the modern critiques. Many who propose a pre-modern understanding of religion do not engage modernity or postmodernity (and those who do often misunderstand their interlocutors). Many postmodern scholars in religion, especially on the continental side of the philosophical divide, avoid any claim that religious experiences concern metaphysics or the category of the “real.” Others, especially those on the analytical side of the divide, are working tirelessly to formulate claims about religion and religious experience that will itemize the infinite and demystify the mystical. That list also goes on and on, and yet in all of these movements, we have not yet overcome the modern critique of religion.
The questions underlying all these movements is, in my view, the same for all: why do we consider experiences “religious?” How do we come to that judgment? Is such a judgment able to withstand critique?
The Future of “Religious” Experience
In my view, the future of religious experience and its study will call us to move in three directions.
First, it will call us to reexamine the history of our discipline, pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. This call is already being answered in many ways today, e.g., in the work to recover liturgy and religious life as dimensions of human existence. Yet, we also need to better explicate the underlying premises and further conclusions of the pre-modern view of religion, as well as the origins of modernity and post-modernity (many of which are pre-modern). We also need to continue crossing the border between philosophy and theology, assessing more accurately and taking more seriously the claims each makes and the demands they make on each other throughout history. Finally, we need to reexamine the foundations of our current discourse, especially given how it seems at once (over-)generalized in its understanding of “religion” and yet still carries on many discussions seemingly under the influence of particular traditions or pre-suppositions.
Second, we need to re-establish our reflections around the religious experiences themselves, and less so around the attempts to formalize the abstract concept of “religion.” It may even be good to leave aside labels like “religious” or “mystical” for the sake of a more open reception of our experiences. I also think that in the academic study of religion, as well as related disciplines, a greater representation of those who are faithful to certain religious traditions may be helpful. Both modernity and post-modernity dismissed many great thinkers for believing the dogmas of their religion. But “bracketing out dogma” need not mean denying one’s faith, any more than Husserl’s bracketing out the existence of things should mean his denial of their existence. We may better learn about religion, and especially the phenomenon of the faith community, if we allow those who are devout to speak in more strictly academic settings without questioning their motives.
Thirdly, we must overcome modernity’s critical dissection of religion and reintegrate the religious worldview. Whether or not we end up using (or re-using) terms like “religious,” “spiritual,” “mystical,” etc., we must no longer be afraid to address the various kinds of questions and claims implied by those terms. Human life is not reducible to metaphysics, but it’s certainly not exclusive of it either. Not every experience can be described exactly, but that does not necessarily make the experience false or “vague.” Human life is an integration of all the concerns we have raised, and in “religion,” broadly speaking, we find what grounds, conserves, and orients that integrity of human life.