Part One: Husserl

I. Phenomenological Explication as Absolute Beginning

*Ideas* Section 24:

that every originarily giving intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything
that originarily presents itself to us (so to speak in its ‘bodily’ actuality [*leibhaftigen
Wirklichkeit*]) in intuition is to be accepted simply as what it gives itself to be—
but also only within the limits in which it gives itself there...Every statement that does no more
than lend expression to such givennesses by *simple explication* and by means of
carefully measured significations is...actually an *absolute beginning*, called upon to
serve as a foundation [*Grundlegung*].

II. The Move Toward the Margins

A. *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*

*From Formal and Transcendental Logic*

Experience [*Erfahrung*] is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all
experience, shines into a room of consciousness; it is not a mere taking of something
alien to consciousness [*Bewusstseinsfremden*] into consciousness.

Experience is the performance [*Leistung*] in which for me, the experiencer, the
experienced being ‘is there’, and is there as *what* it is with the whole content and the
mode of being that *experience itself*, by the performance going on in its intentionality,
*attributes* to it [*zumeint*].
Experience is what tells me here \textit{[die mir dabei sagt]}: I have experience of myself with primary originality; of others, of another’s psychic life, with a merely secondary originality, since another’s psychic life is essentially inaccessible to me \textit{[fremde mir]} in direct perception. \textit{(FTL, 232-233, my emphasis)}.

B. Intersubjectivity As Absolute

\textit{From Formal and Transcendental Logic}

This intersubjectivity, according to its sense, also exists, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, “in itself and for itself”: with the mode of existence that belongs to something “absolute. An absolute existent is existent in the form, an intentional life—which no matter what else it may be intrinsically conscious of, is, at the same time, consciousness of itself \textit{(FTL, 273)}.

Likewise as a transcendental ego (as living in the absolute attitude), I find myself as determined from the outside \textit{[von aussen bestimmt]}….It is obvious that, transcendently speaking, I can be conditioned by something “external” \textit{[“Ausseren”]}, by something that goes beyond my self-contained ownness, only if it has the sense “someone else” \textit{[“Anderer”]} and \textit{in a thoroughly understandable manner}, gains and legitimates in me its acceptance as being another transcendental ego \textit{(FTL, 276, my emphasis)}.

III. Meaning of Inside and Outside

this intending-beyond-itself \textit{[Uber-sich-hinaus-Meinen]}, which is implicit in any consciousness, must be considered an essential moment of it. That, on the other hand, this intending is, and must be, a “meaning more” of the Same becomes shown only by the evidence of a possible making distinct and, ultimately, of an intuitive uncovering \textit{[anschaulicher Enthullung]}, in the form of actual and possible continued perceiving \textit{[“Fort-wahrnehmens”]} or of possible recollecting, as something to be done on my initiative \textit{(CM, 46)}.
If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely—nonsense. But even nonsense is always a mode of sense and has its nonsensicalness within the sphere of possible insight” (CM, 84).

IV. The Alien Other Person as a Strange Body

a certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the substratum “primordial world,” which in any case is the incessantly underlying basis) and making present to consciousness a “there too” [Mit-da] which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an “itself there” [Selbst-da]. We have here, accordingly, a kind of making “co-present” [Mitgegenwartig-Machens] a kind of “appresentation” (CM, 109).

The body [Körper] that is a member of my primordial world (the body subsequently of the other ego) is for me a body in the mode There. Its manner of appearance does not become paired in a direct association with the manner of appearance actually belonging at the time to my animate organism [Leib] (in the mode Here); rather it awakens reproductively another, an immediately similar appearance included in the system constitutive of my animate organism as a body [Körper] in space. It brings to mind the way my body would look “if I were there” [“wenn ich dort ware”]…The first-awakened manner of my appearance of my body [Körper] is not the only thing that enters into a pairing; my body itself [er selbst] does so likewise. Thus the assimilative apperception becomes possible and established by which the external body [Körper] over there receives analogically from mine the sense, animate organism [Leib], and consequently the sense organism [Leib] belonging to another “world” analogous to my primordial world (CM, 117-118).

V. Intersubjectivity as Mutual Internality and Self-Objectivation

The immediate [aktuelle] “I” performs an accomplishment through which it constitutes a variational mode [Abwandlungsmodus] of itself as existing (in the mode of having passed). Starting from this we can trace how the immediate “I,” flowingly-statically present, constitutes itself in self-temporalization [Selbstzeitigung] as enduring [dauerndes] through “its” pasts. In the same way [Ebenso], the immediate “I,” already enduring in the enduring primordial sphere, constitutes itself another as other [Andern als Andern]. Self-temporalization through depresentation [Ent-Gegenwartigung], so to speak (through recollection) has its analogue in my self-alienation [Ent-Fremdung] (empathy as a depresentation of a higher level—
depresentation of my primal presence [Urprasenz] into a merely presentified [vergegenwartige] primal presence. Thus in me “another I” achieves ontic validity as copresent [kompräsent] with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which are obviously quite different from those of a “sense”-perception (Crisis, 185).

Each transcendental “I” within intersubjectivity (as coconstituting [mitkonstituierendes] the world in the way indicated) must necessarily be constituted in the world as a human being; in other words, that each human being “bears within himself [in sich tragt] a transcendental I”—not as a real part or a stratum of his soul (which would be absurd) but rather insofar as he is the self-objectification [Selbstobjektivation], as exhibited through phenomenological self-reflection [Selbstbesinnung], of the corresponding transcendental “I”

(Crisis, 186).

**Part Two: Scripture**

I. Deuteronomy
   A. “And the Lord gave me the two stone tablets written with the finger of God” 9:10.
   B. “So now O Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you? Only to fear the Lord your God, to walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and to keep the commandments of the Lord your God and his decrees that I am commanding you today, for your own well-being. ..For the Lord your God is God of gods and Lord of lords...who executes justice for the widow and orphan, and who loves the strangers, providing them food and clothing. You shall also love the stranger for you were strangers in the land of Egypt” 10:12-22.

II. Matthew 25

III. Ruth

IV. Esther

V. John 20

VI. Luke 1, Mark 1, John 1